

8 February 1963

This paper expands and supplements that sent by the DCI to the President on 7 February. No material has been deleted, but the order of items has been changed.

ADDITIONAL POINTS IN SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S PRESENTATION

NOT DIRECTLY DISCUSSED BY MR. MCCONE

Page 1. Implication that all reconnaissance flights since 1 July flown by US military aircraft.

Page 8. Flat statement that the Navy had photographed all ships during August-October. This is not true.

Page 18. Statement that 16 ships turned around, against DCI's 15. This is bookkeeping, not a significant difference.

Page 22. The IL-28 crate story is distorted. The photographs were not received in Washington until 9 or 10 October. CIA knew from previous experience in Egypt, etc., that these crates did in fact contain IL-28s; DIA had to be convinced. The information was published in the Bulletin of 11 October. See also statement on p. 45, in which arrival of IL-28s is moved up to early September and time required to recognize them further stretched out.

Page 27. Note publicizing of US estimate of the characteristics of the SA-2 and MIG-21 systems. Also the specific statement that "the first evidence" of SA-2s came from photography of 29 August.

Page 28. Statement of our ability to enlarge "several hundred times."

Page 40. The statement that these flights took place between 5 September and 14 October, as worded, draws attention to the critical period without answering the question. The actual dates were 5, 26, and 29 September, and 5 and 7 October.

Page 40. Note the statement on the "risk of degrading our intelligence capability."

1. LESSENING OF THE THREAT

Secretary McNamara

"Cuba is a lessening military threat to the extent that the military personnel of the Soviet Union and their equipment are being removed. As you point out, 5,000 Soviet military personnel have moved out in the last eight or nine weeks and there appears to be some continuing movement out."

Mr. McCone

(Public Statement)

/After withdrawal of the offensive missiles and bombers.7 There remain large quantities of Soviet tanks, guns, aircraft, and troops, most of which arrived before the quarantine. A relatively small amount of Soviet military equipment has reached Cuba in the period since the quarantine." (pp. 7-8)

(Mahon; second day; Helms speaking) "Question: I assume you have no information to indicate the Soviet Union is making plans to evacuate Cuba? Answer: We find no evidence of this, Mr. Chairman." (p. 278)

(Stennis; first day) "I do not dismiss in the least the possibility of a new missile appearing, and it is a matter of great concern, and that is why I cannot explain this complex of surface-to-air missiles as being, remaining, in the hands of the Soviets. I cannot understand why there are 17,000 people there or why there are four army units, nor can I understand why there has been a continual improvement in their communications not only on the island but with Moscow...." (p. 48)

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"We have no discernible and appreciable build-up since the time of the quarantine.... I think they are replacing equipment and spare parts and rotating people, but they are maintaining a very substantial installation and complement of military personnel." (p. 66)

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2. REMOVAL OF FROGS

Secretary McNamara

"Recently, our reconnaissance has revealed that certain equipment of these Soviet combat forces, namely that associated with the tactical rocket units, has also started to be moved out of the island back to Soviet Union." (p. 36; see also Mr. Hughes, p. 34)

Mr. McCone

(Public Statement) "In addition, there are several advanced-type tactical rocket launchers...." (p. 6)

(Mahon; second day)
/Presented chart showing continued presence of 24-32 FROGS./

(Stennis; first day)
"The FROG rockets, there were 24 to 32, and still the same amount /at present/." (p. 55)

(Stennis; second day)
"Some six weeks ago, we noted that 10 or 12 FROG missile launchers were on the dock at Mariel, I believe, and presumably were loaded on a ship. We continued to carry the number of missiles, of FROG missiles, and launchers, in Cuba that I mentioned yesterday, which the range is 24 to 32." (p. 93)

"We have not detected any withdrawal since that time /the missiles and bombers/. We consider...we cannot explain the withdrawal of the few FROG launchers, whether they were defective or whether they were in excess of the unit requirements, we have no way of evaluating. But we have not seen the others withdrawn." (p. 100)

Note: This one is messy. The objects photographed were FROG missile transporters, not launchers. It cannot be proved that they had missiles on them and our school holds

they were at dockside to pick up missiles. We (CIA) think they were taken out; we don't know why. DIA does not believe they were withdrawn and also holds 24-32. No change has been noted in the number present at the armored group camps. We think Mr. McNamara is basing his "lessening" case on a very slender need.

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3. SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

Secretary McNamara

"I have no evidence that Cuba is being used as a base for subversion directed against other Latin American countries." (p. 47)

Mr. McCone

(Stennis; first day)
"The most significant change in the Cuban policy, the most significant discernible change in the Cuban policy, since the missile crisis has been greatly increased subversion in other Latin American countries. This has been an element in Castro's program. Indications are multiplying that it is a new and high priority Cuban objective." (p. 57)

"There is no question about the fact that this is the bridgehead of communism into all of Latin America."

"Q. If we don't get them /the Soviets/ out of Cuba the chances are excellent that we will lose Central and South America.

A. It will erode away quite rapidly, in my opinion." (p. 64)

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4. SHIPMENT OF ARMS

Secretary McNamara

"There are no amphibious capabilities or no capabilities in Cuba such that they could move any of this equipment to any other part of the hemisphere....

"They have no equipment for making such shipments."
(p. 38)

Mr. McCone

(Stennis; second day)
"They do not have the resources for the support of a mass military operation."

"Question: ...if they put these tanks--offensive, defensive weapons, relative talk--tanks on a freighter to this fellow Jagan...if anybody really wants to take over these tanks and troops would be priceless, would they not?

"Answer: Oh, yes, they could ship arms. However... we haven't found a single instance where appreciable quantities of arms have been exported into any Latin American country." (pp. 113-114)

5. SIZE OF FORCES

Secretary McNamara

"I think it is clear that much Soviet equipment has been moved into Cuba, but I think also we should put in perspective the quantities. I have mentioned to you and showed you pictures today of the Soviet ground force equipment. It is the type of equipment that is associated with four reinforced battalions. That is a very, very small force. It is not an offensive force in any normal sense of the word 'offensive.'" (p. 41)

"The remaining Soviet presence in Cuba...is limited to four combat forces, roughly each the size of a reinforced battalion, plus such other technical and advisory personnel as are associated with the air defense units and the training of Cubans in the use of the patrol craft and coastal defense equipment furnished to them." (p. 51)

Mr. McCone

(Public Statement) "The intelligence community of the United States Government continues to keep under close surveillance and to report currently on this extraordinary deployment of sizeable Soviet military forces into the Western Hemisphere." (p. 8)

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6. PRESENCE OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

Secretary McNamara

"Q. Mr. Secretary, to pull all of this together, can you then say that you are personally convinced that there is absolutely not one single offensive system in Cuba, of any kind, any place, anywhere?

A. I think that is quite a certification. I don't believe it would be wise to use your exact words. But I do want to leave no doubt in your minds. I am satisfied that there are no offensive weapons systems in Cuba, and I am satisfied of this beyond any reasonable doubt." (p. 45)

Mr. McCone

(Public Statement) "So far the findings /on the continuing presence of offensive weapons and bombers/ have been negative. Absolute assurance on these matters however could only come from continuing, penetrating on-site inspection." (p. 3)

(Stennis; first day) "We go on to state that we cannot say with absolute certainty that all of the missiles are out of Cuba. We believe that they are out and it is our considered judgment that they are, but absolute assurance on these matters, however, could only come from continuing penetrating on-site inspection." (p. 15)

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7. CONCEALMENT IN CAVES

Secretary McNamara

"I am satisfied that there are no major elements of offensive weapons systems in the caves in Cuba. I believe that the photography which we have carried out...of all Soviet ships moving into Cuban waters, and of the equipment which has been unloaded from those ships, makes it unlikely beyond any reasonable doubt that offensive weapons system equipment could not have been unloaded and moved into caves without our detection." (p. 45)
/Mr. McNamara did not mention on-site inspection in this context./

Mr. McCone

(Public Statement)

"...there have been a number of reports that offensive weapons have been concealed in caves. ...all statements alleging the presence of offensive weapons are meticulously checked. So far the findings have been negative. Absolute assurance on these matters, however, could only come from continuing, penetrating on-site inspection." (p. 3)

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8. NUMBER OF MRBM'S

Secretary McNamara

"We have a record of the number of missiles observed in Cuba, and we have recorded that exact number moving onto ships and on the ships moving into the home waters of the Soviet Union." (p. 44)

"As you know, we covered the entire island of Cuba with fine-resolution photography--located 42 missiles and their associated equipment...accounted for all the equipment and all the missiles leaving Cuba...." (p. 46)

Mr. McCone

(Stennis; first day) "We had seen 33 missiles in various locations. We actually saw 42 of them go out. We had estimated at that time that there might be 48 on the island." (p. 35)

(Public Statement) "Photography...proves our satisfaction the withdrawal of 42 medium-range missiles...." (p. 3)

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9. NUCLEAR WARHEADS

Secretary McNamara

"Our aerial reconnaissance has permitted us to verify that... remove all of the missiles and key system components from the island...." (p. 32)

"The movement of nuclear warheads into Cuba I believe occurred. I believe we observed it in certain vehicles, and we observed the movement of those vehicles out of Cuba." (p. 43)

Mr. McCone

(to Stennis; first day)
"We have not seen nuclear warheads. We are satisfied nuclear warheads were there for the medium-range missiles. We did not see them.

"We identified carriers and transports, because of their unusual characteristics and the way they were guarded, we were convinced they were nuclear warhead transporters. But we did not actually see a nuclear warhead in being on a missile.

"...I have no proof from our intelligence resources or our photography that they were either there or they were not there.

"I am satisfied, however, that they would not have brought the complex of missiles into the state of readiness as rapidly as they did on the urgent basis without having the warhead immediately at hand. Now, I can't conceive of them having left the warheads there after withdrawing the missiles." (pp. 29-32)

(to Stennis; second day)
"...we have not seen the warheads come in, we have not seen them there nor have we seen them leave, but we have seen these special vehicles which we think are warhead transporters." (p. 103)

10. OFFENSIVE VS. DEFENSIVE

Secretary McNamara

"It is very difficult to draw the precise line between an offensive weapon and a defensive weapon. I think under the circumstances most of you would agree that the medium-range ballistic missiles and the intermediate-range ballistic missiles are offensive weapons. I think most would agree that rifles, under circumstances in which they exist in Cuba, are probably defensive weapons.

"The other weapons of the types we described appear to us to be properly described as defensive in the environment in which they are deployed in Cuba. (p. 41)

"At the present time, as we reported to you, we see nothing but defensive arms on the Island of Cuba." (p. 47)

Mr. McCone

(Stennis; first day)

"And while a great many spokesmen draw a very fine sharp line between offensive and defensive installations, I am not inclined to draw that sharp a line."

"Well, all of the equipment that we observed is of a character the fundamental purpose of which is defensive. However, I did not dismiss its use for other purposes." (p. 44)

"The offensive capability of anything that we know is in Cuba at the present time is limited. If any of the aircraft or other items, if an attempt were made to use them for offensive purposes, it would be limited in its radius of active operation, but nevertheless it could be used as such. (p. 45)

11. SUBMARINE BASES

Secretary McNamara

"No, and I think perhaps what you have in mind is that there are recurring rumors that the Soviets have established submarine bases on the shores of Cuba, bases which might presumably be used for submarines carrying missiles. We have no evidence whatsoever that such bases have been established. As a matter of fact, we have positive evidence that they have not been." (p. 44)

Mr. McCone

(Stennis; first day) "We know of no submarines in the vicinity of Cuba at the present time. In October there were four submarines that we had under surveillance that were west of the Azores, and a mother ship in the vicinity of the Azores which we likewise had under surveillance.

"They are building a harbor under the cover of a fishing trawler harbor. I have no doubt but what they will install in Cuba facilities for the maintenance of submarines.

"The Soviet nuclear submarine fleet and its missile-launching fleet is growing, as you know, and it would be very convenient for them to have a place to operate out of." (pp. 60-61)

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"These are very ominous and important developments, in my opinion." (pp. 52-53)

12. CAPABILITIES OF MIG-21

Secretary McNamara

"Those aircraft /MIG-21s/ do not have a nuclear bombing capability under normal circumstances and they are not configured for such missions at the present time.

"Moreover our air defenses are such that were they to be configured for bombing missions, carrying the maximum bomb load that they would be capable of, their range would be very, very low and their radius of action under the probable tactics that they would use, on the order of 100 nautical miles." (p. 39)

Mr. McCone

(Stennis; first day)

"The MIG-21 is a high speed MACH 2 aircraft which can be used for both ground support and air defense. Its armament includes infrared, homing, air-to-air missiles. It has a combat radius of about 350 nautical miles.

"The MIG-21 aircraft is probably capable of carrying nuclear weapons. However, this fighter which has been observed in flight for several years has never been seen practicing as a nuclear weapons carrier either in Cuba or Eastern Europe.

"If a nuclear weapon was attached to this aircraft, its radius of action would be restricted to about 200 nautical miles, and then only under visual flight conditions...." (p. 27)